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Case No. 20160500-SC 
INTHE 
UT AH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Supplemental Brief of Petitioner 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court ordered the parties to show cause why the State's petition should 
not be dismissed "based on standing and/ or mootness." Order to Show Cause. The 
Court is concerned that the State is not asking it to change the outcome- affirming 
Defendant's conviction. 
The court of appeals held that the trial court committed a Doyle error. But it 
affirmed the conviction because the error was not prejudicial. The State asked for, 
and the Court granted, review on the first holding. The State did not ask to upset 
the second. 
The State has standing and the case is not moot. The State did prevail in the 
judgment on lack-of-prejudice grounds and does not ask to upset that holding. 
But the alternative error holding will erroneously impede its ability to present 
valuable evidence in future trials, and the State will have no meaningful means of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
review. The Court consequently should not dismiss the petition. But if it does, it 
should vacate the alternative holding. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
AS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, THE STATE HAS STANDING TO 
APPEAL AND THE CASE IS NOT MOOT BECAUSE THE 
COURT CAN GRANT THE STATE RELIEF 
Relying on State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994), and Geer v. Kadera, 671 
N.E.2d 692 (Ill. 1996), this Court opined that "it does not appear that a decision by 
this Court regarding the proper interpretation of Doyle will affect the result in this 
case" and requested that the parties show cause why the petition should thus not 
be dismissed "based on standing and/ or mootness." Order to Shau, Cause. 
This Court should not dismiss the petition. The State has standing to appeal 
because it is aggrieved by the court of appeals' holding that the State committed a 
Doyle violation and this Court can grant the State relief from that adverse holding. 
A. The State has standing to appeal because it is aggrieved by the 
court of appeals' holding that its actions violated the United States 
Constitution. 
To have standing to appeal, a party "must be aggrieved by a judgment or 
order." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). Normally, a 
prevailing party does not have standing to appeal because he is not aggrieved by a 
favorable judgment. Id. See also Geer v. Kadera, 671 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Ill. 1996) (" a 
party cannot complain of error which does not prejudicially affect it, and one who 
has obtained by judgment all that has been asked for in the trial court cannot 
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appeal from the judgment."). But this is not always true. "In an appropriate case, 
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the 
merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as the 
party retains a stake in the appeal. ... " Roper, at 445 U.S. at 334. In other words, 
so long as a prevailing party is "aggrieved" by an adverse holding, it has standing 
to appeal. Id. 
Many courts have thus determined that a prevailing party has standing to 
appeal an adverse holding of a lower court. See Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) (holding that prevailing party had standing to appeal 
where ruling on immaterial issue might later be basis for collateral estoppel); 
Roper, 445 U.S. at 333-336 (holding that prevailing party had standing to appeal 
immaterial class certification ruling); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930-931 (1983) (holding that government, although it 
prevailed below, had standing to appeal because it "was sufficiently aggrieved by 
the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise 
take"); Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.3d 1371, 1375-1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(holding that government, even though prevailing party, had standing to appeal 
lower court's reasoning where government was forced to adopt it on remand); 
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 263 n.6 (3rd Cir. 
1991) (holding that prevailing party, a federal agency, had standing to appeal 
because court's dismissal of count could work a collateral estoppel against it in 
another case); Department of Defense, Office of Dependents Schools v. Federal Labor 
-3-
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Relations Authority, 879 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that agency had standing 
to appeal favorable dismissal based on adverse legal premise that agency head 
had no power to review and disapprove of collective bargaining agreements); 
Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275-1276 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that prevailing party had standing to appeal favorable judgment where lower 
court dismissed without prejudice alternate state-law claims, leaving prevailing 
party open to further litigation); Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 656 F.3d 
1129, 1139-1141 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that government had standing to appeal 
unfavorable ruling because ruling constrained its discretion on remand even 
though it prevailed in final judgment). 
Cmnreta v. Greene is particularly relevant here. 563 U.S. 692 (2011). In 
Greene, the United States Supreme Court held that a government official had 
standing to appeal the circuit court's adverse holding that the official's conduct 
violated the Constitution even though the official prevailed in the judgment 
because the circuit court also held that he was entitled to governmental immunity. 
Id. at 699. The Supreme Court explained that the official was sufficiently 
aggrieved to maintain standing because "only by overturning the ruling on appeal 
can the official gain clearance to engage in the conduct in the future." Id. at 702-
703. Standing thus "will often be met when immunized officials seek to challenge 
a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution." Id. at 703-704. 
Greene identified two "policy reaso[ns] ... of sufficient importance" that 
further supported standing. Id. at 704 (omission in original) (quoting Roper, 445 
-4-
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U.S. at 336 n.7). First, the circuit court's holding established "controlling law" that 
would have a "significant future effect on the conduct of public officials." Id. at 
704-705. And even though the "Court reviews judgments, not statements in 
opinions," "a constitutional ruling in a qualified immunity case is a legally 
consequential decision," "not mere dicta or statements in opinions." Id. at 704, 713 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). See also id. at 708 ("No mere dictum, a 
constitutional ruling preparatory to a grant of immunity creates law that governs 
the official's behavior."). 
Second, if the Supreme Court had declined to hear the case, the government 
was limited in seeking review of the circuit court's holding. Id. Indeed, it put the 
official in the '"unenviable choice"' of either acquiescing "in a ruling that he had 
no opportunity to contest in this Court, or 'defy the views of the lower court, 
adhere to practices that have been declared illegal, and thus invite new suits."" Id. 
at 708 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 240-241 (2009)). 
For these same reasons, the State is aggrieved by the court of appeals' 
"ruling that [its] conduct violated the Constitution." Id. at 703-704. And only by 
overturning the ruling on appeal can the [State] gain clearance to engage in 
[constitutional] conduct in the future." Id. at 702-703. 
Moreover, the same two important reasons that supported standing in 
Greene support the State's standing here. First, the court of appeals' erroneous 
holding will have binding precedential effect that will bar the State from using 
evidence that the United States Constitution does not prohibit it from using. As 
-5-
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explained in the State's merits briefs, Doyle only prohibits the State from using a 
defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony that 
offers an exculpatory explanation. Doyle does not, however, prohibit using post-
Miranda statements that conflict with the exculpatory trial testimony. 
The court of appeals held, however, that certain post-Miranda statements are 
the equivalent of silence and cannot be used to impeach the exculpatory trial 
version. And as explained there, Defendant's post-Miranda statements conflicted 
with his trial testimony. Defendant feigned ignorance of the crime when he spoke 
to police. At trial, however, he told the jury that he knew all about the crime and 
asserted that it was an accident. Those two versions cannot be reconciled and 
Supreme Court precedent allowed the State to explore that conflict. And even 
though the court affirmed on lack-of-prejudice grounds, its alternative error 
holding bans the use of constitutionally admissible evidence in future cases. 
Second, the State is effectively foreclosed from seeking review of this 
important constitutional question. Like the government in Greene, the State is in 
the '"unenviable choice"' of either acquiescing "in a ruling that [it] had no 
opportunity to contest in this Court, or 'defy the views of the lower court, [and] 
adhere to practices that have been declared illegal."" Id. at 708. Indeed, the only 
potential avenue of review would arise if (1) a prosecutor violates McCallie's rule 
and uses a defendant's "silence-equivalent" statements against him at trial; (2) 
either (a) defense counsel does not object and the trial court does not intervene, or 
(b) defense counsel objects but the trial court overrules the objection contrary to 
-6-
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McCallie; (3) defendant is convicted and appeals; (4) the court of appeals 
determines that there is both a McCallie error and the error is prejudicial; and (5) 
this Court accepts certiorari review. The State is thus aggrieved by the court of 
appeals' holding and has standing sufficient to maintain this Court's review. 
Geer v. Kadera - the case cited in the Court's Order to Show Cause- does not 
change this conclusion. In Geer, an appellate court affirmed dismissal of Geer's 
suit and, in dicta, invited him to pursue a common law wrfr of mandamus. 671 
N.E.2d at 694-695. Geer did so. Id. at 695. Kadera-not Geer-sought certiorari 
review of the first dismissed case, seeking reversal of the II ruling" that a writ of 
mandamus may lie. Id. The Geer court held that Kadera did not have standing to 
appeal because he had prevailed below, the statement about mandamus was non-
binding dicta, and the court had no power to decide whether mandamus may lie 
in a different pending case involving different parties. Id. at 699-700. 
Unlike here, Kadera was not aggrieved. Id. And the policy reasons 
supporting standing were not present- there was no binding adverse holding of 
constitutional dimensions of which he likely could not seek judicial review. Id. 
Indeed, as Greene explained, "a constitutional ruling" - even if II immaterial" given 
the ultimate resolution of the case-"is a legally consequential decision," "not 
mere dicta." 563 U.S. at 704, 713. See also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 
(1992) (explaining that "[h]armless-error analysis is triggered only after the 
reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed"); State v. Hummel, 
2017 UT 19, if 38, _ P.3d _ ('' [T]he principle of stare decisis is focused on holdings 
-7-
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of our prior decisions."). Kadera was not subject to a constitutional ruling. The 
State is. And Kadera could have challenged whether mandamus was appropriate 
in the mandamus proceeding. As shown, the State has no realistic avenue to 
review the court of appeals' holding. 
In sum, the State has standing to appeal the court of appeals' erroneous 
constitutional holding. This Court should not dismiss the petition. 
B. This case is not moot because the Court can grant the State relief. 
A case becomes moot when a petitioner '"no longer suffers actual injury 
that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."' Keller Tank Seros. II, Inc. v. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue,_ F.3d _J 2017 WL 1424973 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1166) (10th Cir. 2016)). See also Chafin v. Chafin, 
133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (11To say that an appeal is moot means that the court 
cannot provide the prevailing party with any relief."). 11This is ordinarily a low 
bar, [so] 'when a court can fashion some form of meaningful relief, even if it only 
partially redresses the grievances of the prevailing party, the appeal is not moot."' 
Con.stand v. Cosby, 833 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Continental 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
Here, the Court can grant the State relief by reversing the court of appeals' 
holding that prohibits it from using constitutionally admissible evidence. Cf 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930-931 (1983) (holding that government could obtain relief 
from "Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would 
otherwise take"). 
-8-
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State v. Sims does not hold otherwise. 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). Unlike 
here, in that case, this Court determined that the writ of certiorari was 
improvidently granted because the petitioner challenged only the lower court's 
state constitutional holding, but not its separate federal constitution holding. As a 
result, any decision the Court made could not grant the petitioner relief. Id. at 841. 
But as shown in Point A, a favorable ruling here can grant the State relief. 
Even if this case were technically moot, it still should not be dismissed 
because it meets the public interest exception to the mootness rule. The court of 
appeals' holding (1) affects the public interest, (2) is likely to recur, and (3) is likely 
to evade review. See State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ,I7, 357 P.3d 547. As explained 
above, McCallie bars the State from using constitutionally admissible evidence in 
every criminal trial. Yet, the State is unlikely to be able to get review unless it and 
the trial court abandon their professional, legal, and moral duty to follow the law. 
For these reasons as well, this Court should not dismiss the petition as moot. 
C. If the Court dismisses the petition, it should also vacate the court 
of appeals' holding. 
VJJ If this Court, however, determines that the State lacks standing or that the 
case is otherwise moot, the State asks this Court to vacate the portion of the court 
of appeals' opinion that holds that the trial court violated Doyle. Cf Utah R. App. 
P. 30(a) (granting appellate court right to "reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise 
dispose of any order or judgment appealed from"). 
-9-
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In Greene, the United States Supreme Court held that while the petitioner 
who prevailed below had standing to appeal an adverse holding, the case had 
become moot on appeal. See Greene, 563 U.S. at 713-714. Nonetheless, the Court 
vacated the portion of the circuit court's decision of which the petitioner sought 
review. Id. This prevented "an unreviewable decision 'from spawning any legal 
consequences,' so that no party is harmed." Id. at 713 ( quoting United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950)). A "'party who seeks review of the merits 
of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ... ought 
not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in' that ruling." Id. at 712. See also Delaivare 
Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 263 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(vacating lower court's ruling on immaterial count to "eradicate[] any preclusive 
effect" on prevailing party). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should not dismiss the petition. 
Respectfully submitted on April 28, 2017. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
(~-~ 
TERA J. PETERSON 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on April 28, 2017, two copies of the Brief of Respondent 
were~ mailed • hand-delivered to: 
Samuel P. Newton 
Law Office of Samuel P. Newton 
The Historic KM Building 
40 2nd Street E, Suite 222 
Kalispell, MT 59901-6113 
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, 
a courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf): 
¢ was filed with the Court and served on appellant. 
• will be filed and served within 14 days. 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
